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Generalized Darwinism (GD) claims to be a conceptual and theoretical framework for researching 
evolutionary change processes in organizations. This paper examines the claims of GD. It finds that in 
contrast to Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection proper, the GD framework is not an 
explanatory deductive argument form. What it is that GD actually generalizes and intends to explain 
thereby becomes somewhat moot. It is proposed that the so-called ‘generalization’ that the GD 
framework supplies might be best understood schematically. Two general schemata that purport to distil 
commonalities between processes of organizational evolution and biological evolution are thereby 
identified. But in considering the applicability of the two schemata to organizational evolution, criticism 
reveals one to be problematic, whereas the other one, to which the GD programme collapses if the 
problematical schema is dispensed with, has been long associated with another so-called ‘evolutionary 
approach’ to the understanding of social change: Sir Karl Popper’s ‘evolutionary epistemology’. The 
paper concludes that if the research problem is to account for the evolutionary character of social and 
organizational change, then theorists need not commit to the GD framework. They may elect to use 
Popper’s evolutionary epistemology instead. 
Key words: Organization, Evolution, Darwin, Popper. 
Introduction: Time, Tide and Evolution 
That ‘time and tide wait for no man’ is one of England’s ancient proverbs; but the wisdom that it 
encapsulates is as readily applicable to organizations and entire societies. Who amongst us now knows 
anything about Briansk Rail and Engineering or the Hohenlohe Iron and Steel companies? Yet 
apparently, a century or so ago, these two were amongst the world’s largest businesses (Ormerod 2005). 
Similarly, who amongst us now knows of the Beothuk tribe? Apparently, they once inhabited what, with 
some irony, we now call Newfoundland. All these once existed, but no longer; to each the passage of time 
did not bring ‘good tidings’—‘tidings’ being the events that unfold across time and tide.1 Many have 
therefore entertained the idea that it is through time and tide that we go on with our lives, ‘…pushing in to 
that tiny bit of the future that our “now” slides into’ (Magee 2016 p. 4), always knowing next to nothing 
about how the organizations in which we may work, or the societies in which we dwell, will change as 
that future unfolds into the continuum of moments that we call ‘now’. What we do know is that the future 
will inevitably happen, but not, according to the proverb, as a single episode or event, nor in a way that 
any one man can design or have the power wholly to control. Indeed, English, with its rich etymology, 
has a word for this idea too. It is derived from the Latin word ‘evolutio’—unrolling. Today, we know it as 
‘evolution’. 
Quite naturally, social theorists attempt to account for the evolutionary character of social change. One 
such account, that was presented recently as the very latest thought on how to understand what its 
proponents variously call ‘organizational evolution’ (Hodgson 2013a p. 973), ‘organizational ecology’ 
(Dollimore 2014a p. 282) and the ‘evolution of socioeconomic populations’ (Dollimore 2014a p. 305) is 
the research programme of so-called ‘Generalized Darwinism’. Generalized Darwinism (GD) makes a 
very bold claim: that the Darwinian theory of biological evolution may be distilled and generalized 
                                                     
1 ‘Tide’ in old English was a word of Germanic origin and it meant a period of time or season. That meaning survives wherever 
today’s English speakers wish ‘good tidings’ to one another. 
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beyond biological phenomena. Thus, to GD, social change is ‘evolutionary’ not only because it 
continually unrolls to no one’s design, it is ‘evolutionary’ because it also shares commonalities with 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection. A process of socio-economic Darwinian ‘organizational evolution’ 
is thereby postulated and held to be worthy of further research, generating a putative research agenda that 
is based upon its concepts and principles. 
Imaginative and bold theoretical conjectures ought always to be welcomed in a science. For only a 
creative thought can move us from a known problem to an unknown solution. Indeed, scientific 
explanation has been presented as the ‘…the reduction of the known to the unknown’ (Popper 2002a 
[1963] p. 83), or the logical derivation of a known fact or known theory from a hitherto unknown 
generalization or theory of higher universality. And if a conjectured explanatory theory is something that 
we actually did ‘know’ all along, but had underestimated by not fully appreciating its explanatory power 
and reach, then that is also to be welcomed. For this is to discover that the theory had a higher level of 
universality than was initially realized. Nevertheless, so far as an empirical science is concerned with 
stopping a falsehood from passing muster, a bold conjecture or idea ought also to be criticized and tested 
once it has been entertained (Popper 2002a [1963], 2002b [1959], 2005 [1983]; Miller 1994, 2006). 
This paper examines the claims of GD. In order to make that task manageable for a paper of this scope, I 
elect only to examine the recent presentation of GD to the readership of the journals of Organization 
Studies (Hodgson 2013a) and Philosophy of the Social Sciences (Dollimore 2014a). These two 
presentations were both programmatic statements designed specifically to introduce GD to researchers 
interested in the philosophy of social sciences and organizational studies. Certainly, I found both papers 
to be long, complex, and packed with footnotes and citations. Consequently, if the proponents of GD are 
serious about advancing our scientific understanding of processes of ‘organizational evolution’, then they 
will surely welcome the critical scrutiny of these specific programmatic statements—for surely that is 
why they were not only offered, but also offered presumably in their strongest and most carefully 
formulated form. Here, without losing sight of the papers, I reduce the GD framework that they presented 
to four more crisply formulated claims. These then become a ready-made hook on which to hang a 
discussion without it becoming encumbered by references to the original literature that seemingly 
developed the GD framework, or indeed to the extensive literature on associated topics such as 
evolutionary economics, organismic perspectives and models of organization, or organismic and 
evolutionist-type social theories more generally. Both papers have in fact already attracted what I 
consider to be useful critical commentaries (Scholz and Reydon 2013; Reydon and Scholz 2014), but that 
criticism was, or so I shall argue, rather too narrow. The principal business of this paper is therefore to 
add to it and then to offer an assessment of where the GD framework does, and does not, work. 
The Claims of Generalized Darwinism 
Organizational evolution is to be understood as a Darwinian process 
Prior to the development of GD, Geoffrey Hodgson (2013a) considers the usage of the term ‘evolution’ in 
organizational research to be conceptually confused, imprecise, and even devoid of meaning. He writes 
that: 
Many organizational researchers refer to ‘evolution’ or ‘co-evolution’ while being insufficiently clear what they 
mean…Terms such as ‘evolution’ or ‘co-evolution’ are often used with gravitas, as if they signify something 
important; but without further specification they actually mean very little…If generalized Darwinism is rejected, then 
what is intended by ‘evolution’ or ‘co-evolution’ must be clearly specified…persistent misuse and imprecision of 
terminology have obstructed the introduction of theoretical insights from generalized Darwinism (Hodgson 2013a pp. 
973-974). 
In contrast, Hodgson (2013a p. 974) claims that a ‘generalized Darwinism...can be useful as an overall 
framework for helping to understand organizational evolution’. It is: 
 …the only complete over-arching theoretical framework available for understanding worlds with populations of 
entities that are struggling for locally and immediately scarce resources. No viable alternative general conceptual 
framework for addressing evolution in complex population systems exists (Hodgson 2013a p. 974). 
Similarly, for Hodgson’s co-worker Denise Dollimore ‘…generalized terms now exist that facilitate the 
conceptualization of Darwinian entities and processes in the socioeconomic domain’ (Dollimore 2014a p. 
284). She presents these as remedying the defects in a previous attempt to apply Darwinian ideas to the 
domain of organizational science: the research programme of so-called ‘organizational ecology’ 
(Dollimore 2014a). For whereas the programme of ‘organizational ecology’ had failed to demonstrate its 
Darwinian credentials proper because it had no counterpart to the genetic and reproductive relations that 
are required to produce a properly Darwinian process of population-level change through biological 
natural selection (Reydon and Scholz 2009), GD claims that it is able, in a fashion, to do precisely this 
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(Dollimore 2014a). Moreover, GD claims that it is also able to accommodate the change brought about in 
an individual organization’s characteristics by intentional adaptation to environmental factors at the level 
of the individual organization, via, for instance, managerial deliberation and volition (Hodgson 2013a; 
Dollimore 2014a). Thus the GD account of ‘organizational evolution’ incorporates a so-called 
‘Darwinian’ population-level selection effect and an effect created by so-called ‘Lamarckian’ adaptation. 
For Dollimore (2014a p. 284; p. 307) this means that: 
…organization scientists can finally begin to construct evolutionary accounts that accommodate both selection and 
adaptation effects in the business world and account for the role of knowledge transmission…The crucial point here is 
that organizational ecologists need to recognize that adaptation and selection are intertwined, not separate, evolutionary 
processes. It is correct that adaptation at the population level is the outcome of a selection process, but for an 
evolutionary explanation of diversity, we must include explanation of the production and replenishment on the variety 
on which selection operates…By constructing a theory that explicitly models replication and inheritance processes, 
organizational ecologists will be able to claim a proper Darwinian selection process. 
Before considering the content of the ‘generalized terms’ (Dollimore 2014a p. 284) that purport to 
substantiate these claims, it will perhaps be useful to digress temporarily from the Hodgson (2013a) and 
Dollimore (2014a) accounts of GD and recap, in a little more detail than they do, on the logically 
deductive rudiments of Charles Darwin’s (1968 [1859]) theory of biological evolution by natural 
selection. In simplistic terms, that omit various auxiliary hypotheses needed to make the derivations valid, 
Darwin’s theory had three deductive arguments at its core:2 
GRI+LR→SE 
Where: ‘GRI’ is a geometrical rate of increase in the population of an organism and ‘LR’ are the limited 
resources to sustain life; the conjunction of these implies a struggle for existence, ‘SE’. 
SE+M→NS 
Where: ‘SE’ is the struggle for existence and ‘M’ is genetic mutation (or in Darwin’s day, hereditable 
variation) that is transmitted from generation to generation through the potential to propagate here and 
now; the conjunction of these implies natural selection, ‘NS’, or the differential loss of differently 
constituted individuals in the population of organisms. 
NS+T→NR 
Where: ‘NS’ is natural selection and ‘T’ is time; the conjunction of these implies natural retention, ‘NR’, 
and change in the genetic composition of the population as the generations succeed one another and some 
disadvantageous variations are selected against.  
Darwinian natural selection is therefore to be understood as a process that operates on a population of 
organisms. Also, as already noted, it is a theory that requires auxiliary premises. For instance, that there 
are regularities in the environment and that the population is relatively isolated. This allows the variants 
within a gene pool to be selected and differentially propagated, rather than be overwhelmed by an influx 
of genes from outside the pool. As Donald T. Campbell (1974a p. 415) wrote: 
The advances produced in the course of evolution are now seen as due to natural-selection, operating upon a pool of 
self-perpetuating variations which the genetics of the breeding group provide, and from within this pool, differentially 
propagating some variations at the expense of others…Considered as improvements or solutions, none of these 
variations has any a priori validity. None has the status of revealed truth…whatever degree of validation emerges 
comes from the differential survival of the winnowing, weeding out process. 
Campbell memorably distilled the Darwinian evolutionary sequence into a conceptual triplet: ‘variation, 
selection, and retention’ (Campbell 1974a p. 421, 1974b p. 143). And it is here that we may return to the 
Hodgson (2013a) and Dollimore (2014a) account of GD and the manner in which they substantiate their 
claim that organizational evolution is to be understood as a Darwinian process. 
A Darwinian process must be represented by two generalizations 
GD, as an account of ‘organizational evolution’, has two pillars. Pillar one is the use of Campbell’s 
(1974a, 1974b) ‘variation, selection, and retention’ phrase to support the claim that Darwin’s theory of 
biological evolution may be distilled and generalized beyond biological phenomena, thereby moving 
toward the meaningful account of ‘organizational evolution’ that GD promises. Hodgson (2013a p. 978) 
                                                     
2 Adapted from Flew (1984 p. 37). For a discussion, see for example, Huxley (1974 [1942] Chapter 1); Mayr (1982 Chapter 11); 
Howard (1982 Chapter 3). 
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calls Campbell’s conceptual triplet the ‘Darwinian principles of variation, selection and retention’. The 
principles are held to be common to both the social and biological domains and reference is duly made to 
Donald Campbell (Hodgson 2013a p. 978; Dollimore 2014a p. 301). Pillar two, which was originally 
developed within modern evolutionary biology to highlight some useful conceptual distinctions within it, 
is the replicator-interactor distinction (Hodgson 2013a p. 976; Dollimore 2014a p. 295). This distinction 
supposedly enables the identification of counterparties in the social world to the genetic and reproductive 
relations that are present in the biological world. GD takes both pillars to be ‘generalizations’ (Dollimore 
2014b p. 377; Hodgson 2013a pp. 978-979); hence, a ‘Generalized Darwinism’. 
Let us examine each pillar in turn. 
‘Organizational evolution’ is supposedly Darwinian not because it is biologically based, but because there 
is the prospect of ‘common ontological features’ between ‘complex population systems’ in both nature 
and society (Hodgson (2013a p. 978). By ‘common ontological features’ across ‘complex population 
system’, Hodgson would seem to have in mind: 
…sets of individually different and demarcated entities that interact with the environment and each other. By definition 
they face immediately scarce resources and struggle to survive, whether through conflict or cooperation. They adapt 
and may pass on information to others, through replication or imitation. Examples of complex population systems are 
plentiful both in nature and society. They include every biological species…And importantly they include human 
organizations, as long as organizations are cohesive entities having some capacity for the retention of information. An 
economic example is an industry involving cohesive organizational entities such as business firms (Hodgson 2013a p. 
978)3 
This idea of ‘ontological communality’ between ‘complex population systems’ (Hodgson (2013a p. 973, 
p. 978; see also Dollimore 2014a p. 302) thereby enables GD to transport its ‘Darwinian principles’ of 
‘variation–selection–retention’ from the biological world to the social world: 
…the evolution of a complex population must involve the three Darwinian principles of variation, selection and 
retention…These abstract principles do not themselves provide all the necessary details, but nevertheless they must be 
honoured, for otherwise the explanation of evolution will be inadequate. In particular, investigations into complex 
populations must address (a) the sources of replenishment of variety in the population (b) how information is passed 
from one entity in the population to another, and (c) why some entities are more successful in surviving or passing on 
information than others (Hodgson 2013a p. 978 [emphasis in original]).4 
Thus, GD claims that the principles of variation, selection and retention apply wherever there are 
mechanisms to enable (a), (b) and (c) above. And in pursuit of the identification of those mechanisms, 
GD adds a second pillar to support its account of ‘organizational evolution’: the neo-Darwinian 
interactor-replicator distinction (Hodgson 2013a; Dollimore 2014a). To GD, the applicability of this 
distinction also represents a ‘generalization’ across the social and biological domains. Hodgson explains 
that modern neo-Darwinian biology identifies the genotype as a mechanism for storing and passing on 
information, how it is hosted by a phenotype, and how it guides the development and behavior of the 
phenotype in its interaction with the environment (Hodgson 2013a p. 976; see also, Dollimore 2014a pp. 
295-296). Consequently, the genotype is a replicator and the phenotype is an interactor. Environmental 
interaction selects the interacting entity, causing the replicator to be differentially reproduced (Dollimore 
2014a pp. 295-297). In biology, the interactor-replicator distinction is therefore a conceptual one; it is 
designed to emphasize the function of the genotype and phenotype in natural selection: what gets selected 
and what thereby gets differentially retained and perpetuated. But this being a conceptual distinction, GD 
proceeds to claim that it may be applied abstractly to any complex population system of individually 
different and demarcated entities that possess a potential to pass information to one another and which 
interact with each other in a resource-constrained environment, including, as claimed previously, an 
industry involving cohesive organizational entities such as business firms. Hence the interactor-replicator 
distinction, or so it is claimed, is applicable to businesses and organizations: 
The term replicator is a generalization of genotype, and the interactor is a generalization of phenotype…These 
concepts are important when we address social entities hosting information-retaining and developmental 
mechanisms…an interactor (is) a relatively cohesive entity that hosts replicators and interacts with its environment in 
such as way as to lead to changes in populations of interactors and their replicators. Social organizations are obvious 
candidate interactors (Hodgson 2013a p. 976).5 
And to emphasize the commonality with biology, the parallel process in biology is emphasised: 
                                                     
3 See also, Denise E. Dollimore, (2014a p. 291). 
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5 On the identification of interactors, Dollimore (2014a p. 296) is more categorical: ‘In biology this is the organism, and in the 
business world, this is the organization of the firm’. 
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A genome is a biological replicator. But there are other replicators, such as routines in organizations…which also hold 
information and guide behaviour. Replication refers to the passing of such problem-solving or developmental 
information from one entity to another. Replication and inheritance are treated as synonyms…the mechanisms of 
replication are very different in the biological and social spheres. But some crucial problem-solving information is 
copied and transmitted from organization to organization, and this amounts to social replication (Hodgson 2013a pp. 
976-977).6 
As can be seen from this quotation, GD has a name for what is produced by the ‘…crucial problem-
solving or developmental information’: ‘routines’. Routines ‘…refer to capabilities of organizational 
teams to carry out sequences of actions. Routines are hosted by organizations as their interactors’ 
(Hodgson 2013a p. 977). More specifically: 
Routines may be defined as organizational dispositions to energize conditional patterns of behaviour within teams, 
involving repeated sequential responses to cues that are partly dependent on social positions in the 
organization…Establishing a routine in a firm means building or using internal relations and positions that enable 
sequential behaviours. These in turn help to develop particular habits and other conditional dispositions among 
individuals (Hodgson 2013a p. 980). 
According to Hodgson (2013a), the transmission of routines from organization to organization happens in 
two ways. Firstly, a routine may be diffused over existing organizations by means of imitation procedures. 
Secondly, a new organization may inherit its routines through a spin off or a franchise arrangement: 
…the difference between the diffusion of routines from organization to organization, on the one hand, and their 
inheritance through business spin-offs is crucial…This difference becomes clear through the replicator-interactor 
distinction, where routines are the replicators and organizations the interactors. Both processes involve replication. But 
diffusion involves existing interactor B copying a routine from interactor A. By contrast spin-offs mean that interactor 
A itself leads to the creation of a new interactor B, which carries some routines from its parent (Hodgson 2013a pp. 
982-983). 
And what the ‘diffusion’ and ‘inheritance’ of routines helps to develop, as noted above, are habits in the 
living, breathing organisms of a social organization: 
Habits are the most elementary replicators in social evolution. They are learned dispositions to behave in a particular 
way in a particular circumstance. They are hosted by individuals (their immediate interactors)…The process of habit 
replication relies on behavioural imitation. In all cases of habit replication, and unlike genes in biology, there is no 
direct copying from replicator to replicator (Hodgson 2013a p. 977). 
Thus, for GD, the abundance of business routines, as a store of copy-ready information that is capable of 
guiding the development of an organization, is taken to be an important factor in the growth of the 
modern economy and in the shaping of worker behaviour within it. Indeed, the role of routines is 
illustrated by a “…‘routines as genes’ metaphor” (Hodgson 2013a p. 977). Hodgson (2013a pp. 981-982) 
proposes that it is necessary that ‘…copy error during replication is minimized’, but that if this is done by 
‘…cloning existing arrangements exactly as possible’ then ‘…tried and tested knowledge’ can be 
disseminated across an economy by ‘business replication strategies’; the practices of several retail and 
service business such as Intel, McDonalds, Ikea, Novotel are mentioned to support this contention 
(Hodgson (2013a p. 982). 
The generalizations allow for organizational-level adaptation 
Yet the question arises as to how this exact ‘cloning’ image fits with the first element of the triadic 
‘variation-selection-retention’. A part of the answer would seem to be that the ‘replication strategies’ of 
routines do not produce uniform outcomes. Hodgson (2013a p. 981) writes that there is a ‘…difference 
between the information encoded in the replicator and its context-dependent expression in the developing 
interactor’ and that ‘…small differences in adaptive capacity from firm to firm may be crucial to survival’ 
(Hodgson 2013a p. 981). As to the origin of the ‘small differences’, Hodgson thinks that they can be the 
product of other routines, such as strategic scenario planning, that encourage ‘the innovation of routines’ 
thereby making the first-order routines more adaptable: ‘Scenario planning involves routines to encourage 
the innovation of routines and to make existing routines more adaptable’ (Hodgson 2013a p. 983). But, 
the claim that a routine may alter another routine raises the prospect of either an infinite regress of 
hierarchically-organized routines or some form of overarching master routine. Neither Hodgson nor 
Dollimore acknowledge this difficulty, but in any event they avoid it. This is because they also claim that 
‘…firms can alter their routines (replicators), whereas (outside modern genetic engineering) no biological 
organism can manipulate its genes (replicators)’ (Hodgson 2013a p. 983); and that ‘…emphatically, 
habits and routines do not imply the absence of choice’ (Hodgson 2013a p. 984; see also, Dollimore 
2014a pp. 307-308). In short, there is also variety proliferation by means of the ‘…learning and 
intentional decision making of organizational leaders’ (Dollimore 2014a p. 308). This enables the 
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deliberate adaptation of organizational routines to environmental factors within any particular 
organization. 
We may define organizational adaptability as the capacity of an organization to change its strategies, structures, 
procedures or other core attributes, in anticipation or response to a change in its environment, including changes in 
relations with other organizations (Hodgson 2013a p. 980) 
The generalizations allow for population-level organizational selection 
The interactor-replicator distinction, as the second pillar of GD, is supposed to enable a meaningful 
account of ‘organizational evolution’ to be placed atop it; an account that Hodgson thinks may quite 
properly be called ‘Darwinian’: 
The identification of distinct social replicators and interactors is a key step in elaborating the proposition that abstract 
Darwinian principles apply to evolution in both nature and society (Hodgson 2013a p. 979). 
And this is because population-level selection occurs: 
Selection occurs because organizations differ both in their inherent characteristics and their local environments. Some 
firms go bankrupt. Some are so successful that their routines are copied by other firms. Others lead to successful spin-
offs. In principle, such differential success and replication amounts to selection…Selection is a major reason for 
changes in the overall profile of a population of organizations (Hodgson 2013a p. 979).7 
And to emphasize that this is a so-called ‘generalized Darwinism’, we are once again reminded of the 
different albeit similar process in biology: 
…selection does not operate on genes themselves. Selection operates on entities whose development was guided by 
genetic replicators in an environmental context. The objects of selection are interactors. Selection leads indirectly to 
changes in the population of hosted replicators…Although the detailed processes are very different, similar remarks 
apply to organizations and the replicators (habits and routines) that they host. Selection operates directly on 
organizations and individuals, which individually are outcomes of development in particular contexts (Hodgson 2013a 
p. 980). 
Two Critics, Two Criticisms 
Marcus Scholz and Thomas Reydon (2013) supply an insightful critique of Hodgson’s (2013a) paper. 
They press two principal criticisms against it. First, they ask what exactly it is that GD seeks to explain—
if GD is the explicans, then what, precisely, is the explicandum? Second, they question GD’s Darwinian 
credentials by highlighting its failure to supply an adequate account of how organizational populations or 
‘species’ are to be identified—given that a biologist’s notion of a reproductive community would seem to 
be inapplicable to organizations. The duo emphasize that a population of organizations cannot be defined 
as a set whose members share some common traits; for in a population that is so defined, no 
fundamentally novel traits can be the subject of population-level selection without placing the 
organization outside the population. 
Hodgson (2013b p. 1002), in his response to the first element of this critique, characterized GD as ‘…an 
overarching meta-theoretical framework for…developing theoretical explanations’ and not a ‘…complete 
theory to explain specific phenomena’ (2013b p. 1003). To him, it is ‘…a repository for contingent 
auxiliary theories and models…a general framework in which additional and context specific explanation 
may be placed’ (2013b p. 1003). As for Scholz and Reydon’s other criticism—the identification of a 
population of organizations—Hodgson reiterated the importance that GD places upon the ‘replicator-
interactor’ conceptual distinction and the possibility that in the social world routines may be replicated by 
either ‘diffusion’ or by ‘inheritance’ (2013b pp. 1003-1004). Hence, for Hodgson: 
Given these possibilities, one option would be to define a species-population of organizations as a set where every 
member can potentially transfer a routine to or from one other member, by diffusion among existing organizations or 
by the creation of a new organization (Hodgson 2013b p. 1004).  
Subsequently, in an exchange with Dollimore, the criticism that GD lacks properly Darwinian credentials 
was elaborated by Reydon and Scholz (2014). They stressed the importance of a reproductive community 
to Darwin’s theory of natural selection in biology; that is, that natural selection is a process that operates 
on a population of organisms as the individuals that comprise it either fail or succeed to reproduce their 
likeness over time. Thus, in a properly Darwinian process, the differential survival of interactors in an 
environment must cause, over time, a differential perpetuation of the replicators that they host. 
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Furthermore, they stressed that the reproductive community must be relatively isolated for the logic of 
Darwinian natural selection to take effect. The duo argued that: 
Biological populations are the systems within which replicators can multiply and minute beneficial variations at the 
replicator level can accumulate to cause novel traits. The existence of reproductive relations between interactors and of 
populations of interactors as comparatively stable and buffered reproductive systems thus is crucial for the occurrence 
of Darwinian evolution…Explaining how routines are transmitted between organizations will not solve the problem. 
Rather the problem is that successful organizations (interactors) do not give rise to offspring organizations that closely 
resemble their “parents”—that is, that organizations do not “breed true” and, indeed, do not breed at all. There is no 
reason to think that routines are transmitted preferably to organizations of the same kind or set…organizations or firms 
are interactors in the weak sense of entities interacting with their environment, but they are not interactors of the right 
sort, that is, interactors capable of forming evolving populations, because they do not reproduce their kind (Reydon and 
Scholz 2014 pp. 370-371 [emphasis in original]) 
In her reply, Dollimore (2014b) found no reason to address Reydon and Schulz (2014) observation that 
reproductive communities must be stable and buffered (i.e. relatively isolated) for differential retention to 
take effect over time. She argued that ‘Slavish adherence to biological analogy for elements of this 
generalized conceptual structure is simply not necessary nor is it helpful’ (Dollimore 2014b p. 378). 
Dollimore proceeded to elaborate how the replication of a routine can occur. Seemingly she thinks that 
none of the following involve a biological analogy: 
Spin-off enterprises offer clear examples of firms giving rise to offspring firms that closely resemble their parents… 
recent research on spin-offs… highlights the importance of inherited know-how from the parent firm (Dollimore 
2014b p. 379 [emphasis added]). 
Franchises offer another example of firms giving rise to new firms that resemble the parent (Dollimore 2014b p. 380 
[emphasis added]). 
Finally, mergers and acquisitions can be seen as a form of “mating” (Dollimore 2014b p. 380 [emphasis added]). 
Without Answers 
My own sense is that the Scholz and Reydon critique of GD is effective, but that it is rather too narrow. It 
leaves many questions concerning the status and content of GD unasked and therefore without answers. 
For instance, Scholz and Reydon (2013) ask what it is that GD seeks to explain. But their question ought 
really to prompt another: what is the logical and scientific status of GD in comparison to Darwin’s own 
theory? They do not explicitly pose this question and Hodgson (2013b p. 1003) is therefore able simply to 
reiterate his view that GD is a ‘meta-theoretical framework’ or ‘general framework in which additional 
and context specific explanation may be placed’. Thus Hodgson (2013b) dismisses the expectation that 
the detailed processes of ‘organizational evolution’ ought to correspond to the details of Darwin’s theory. 
In turn, my own sense is that this would seem to make the basis of Schulz and Reydon’s criticism of GD 
to be purely verbal. That is, a dispute over just how much a theory must resemble Darwin’s own before it 
may legitimately be called ‘Darwinian’. But if this is a fair characterisation of Hodgson’s response to 
Scholz and Reydon (2013) then their exchange requires a denouement. For an underlying question 
remains: what is it that GD ‘generalizes’, or more specifically, what is the scientific status of its purported 
generalizations in comparison to Darwin’s own theory of natural selection? 
Equally, for Scholz and Reydon (2013), a properly Darwinian process of population-level selection 
requires a stable and buffered reproductive community with ancestor-descendent and mating relations 
between its members. Organizations, they claim, do not meet these criteria. So the strength of what I have 
called the ‘second pillar’ of the GD account of ‘organizational evolution’—the interactor-replicator 
distinction—is to them completely undemonstrated. But, in their respective responses, Hodgson and 
Dollimore simply reiterate their view that the so-called ‘diffusion’ and ‘inheritance’ of business routines 
in a resource constrained environment are sufficient to establish a population-level selection process 
wherever there are organizations capable of imitating one another, or wherever there are organizations 
capable of establishing new organizations through franchise, merger, or spin-off arrangements. But this 
stand-off also leaves many questions unasked and therefore without answers. In particular, if the 
interactor-replicator pillar of the GD framework is dispensed with—Ockham’s razor style—then the first 
pillar, the so-called Darwinian principles of variation-selection-retention, would seemingly, in some 
sense, remain. So might GD’s notion of the ‘diffusion’ and ‘inheritance’ of routines be conceptualized 
using these terms alone? And, if so, in what sense might that account also be called ‘evolutionary’, 
perhaps even a ‘Darwinian’ theory of ‘organizational evolution’, and perhaps even a ‘generalization of 
Darwin’, but perhaps not a ‘Generalized Darwinism’? 
Next, I shall attempt to answer these various questions. 
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The Scientific Status of Generalized Darwinism: Schemata or Testable 
Hypothesis? 
As previously noted, Charles Darwin (1968 [1859]) used a deductive argument to explain the mechanisms 
of evolutionary change in a biological population. His argument thereby contained an explanation of 
phenomena that are empirically observable. For instance, phenomena such as the extinction of life forms, 
the divergence and increased differentiation in the structure and behaviour of life forms, the teeming 
variety of life on earth. All importantly, Darwin’s deductive argument showed how seemingly designed 
or mind-directed phenomena may be the product of chance variation and natural selection. Consequently, 
many of Darwin’s more colorful terms are best understood metaphorically—for nature knows nothing of 
a struggle for existence nor of a process of natural selection. What exists are material organisms which 
leave offspring. And Darwin’s theory, in a nutshell, is that some organisms are more likely to leave 
offspring than others (Flew 1984; Popper 1999). 
Antony Flew (1984 p.17), in his assessment of the philosophical and scientific status of Darwin’s theory, 
had little hesitation in classifying it as ‘truly scientific’. He used Karl Popper’s (2002b [1959]; 2005 
[1983]) proposed criteria of falsifiability to demarcate those statements that belong to an empirical 
science from those that do not. For instance, Flew argued that if Darwin’s theory were true then evidence 
of extinction and something other than present life forms would be implied by a fossil record (Flew 1984 
p. 18). Also, for Flew (1984 p. 25), the theory of natural selection prohibits the retention of any 
characteristic that places a species at a competitive disadvantage in the struggle for existence. 
Nevertheless, Karl Popper, the originator of the falsifiability criterion for demarcating science from 
metaphysics, was more circumspect in his assessment of Darwin’s theory (Popper 2002c [1974]; Popper 
1987). Popper (2002c [1974]) viewed Darwin’s theory as a system of conjoined statements with the 
hypothesis of natural selection at its core. Consequently, for Popper, how to distinguish what is 
predictable by that specific hypothesis from the gradual change that genetic mutation would entail with or 
without natural selection presents a difficulty. One might say, as did Flew (1984), that with natural 
selection such change cannot be, over time, disadvantageous in the struggle for existence. But another 
problem that Popper (2002a [1974]) identified was how to define the retention of disadvantageous 
changes if non-retention is also the very definition of a change being disadvantageous. On the other hand, 
Popper (1987) noted that if Darwin’s theory is formulated more boldly as a series of strictly universal 
statements—for instance, that all complex organs and all forms of behavior have evolved by natural 
selection because they are useful to survival—then it would seem to be refuted by those organs and 
behavioral programs whose retention has not been attributed to natural selection. That said, Popper was 
fascinated by Darwinian biology and wrote that ‘…the theory is invaluable. I do not see how, without it, 
our knowledge could have grown as it has done since Darwin’ (Popper 2002c [1974] p. 199). 
GD, in comparison, does not wrestle with these difficulties because it only ever gestures toward the 
explanation of any particular state of affairs. Although Hodgson (2013a p. 979) may compare its 
generality to the way that Newton’s laws of motion apply to billiard balls, spacecraft and planets, he fails 
to formulate an explanation of any particular state of organizational affairs in the form of a deductive 
argument with testable implications. The supposed ‘general framework’ that GD supplies is not derived 
from a strictly universal statement and Hodgson’s preferred label for it—‘meta-theory’—does not make 
GD a higher-order explanatory theory or a theory of greater universality to Darwin’s own. Crucially, in 
that sense, GD does not encompass Darwin’s theory and more besides. 
My own sense is that it is Dollimore who comes closest to disclosing accurately GD’s scientific status. In 
discussing what it is that makes GD a ‘generalization’, she writes:  
Whereas analogy is about mapping knowledge from one domain to another, generalization resists any analytical bias 
and begins by observing complex mixes of different entities, processes, and systems of relations and striving to 
identify essential features held in common. In this way, scientists draw out general principles unconstrained by the 
detailed mechanisms of any one domain and then formulate these at fairly high levels of abstraction (Dollimore  2014b 
p. 377). 
Aside from her implicit claim that generalizations rest upon an inductivist empiricist method, which for 
present purposes may be ignored, Dollimore’s description fits with my own sense that GD is comprised of 
‘schemata’. By a ‘schema’ I mean some form of conceptualization that suggests that different things or 
processes have something in common. Although neither Dollimore nor Hodgson use this term, it is 
schemata, I think, which GD supplies with its ‘variation-selection-retention’ conceptual triplet and its 
‘interactor-replicator’ conceptual distinction. Such schemata, of course, do not specify a mechanism of 
change for any particular phenomena because they are not, in and of themselves, explanatory theories of a 
particular phenomenon. A theory, however, may fall under the rubric of a schema—as is demonstrated by 
the fact that the ‘variation-selection-retention’ triplet was used by Donald Campbell (1974a p.421, 1974b 
9 
p.143) to capture the similarity between Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection and Popper’s 
philosophy of science and methodology of empirical falsification.8 In Popper’s philosophy of science, 
there may be an unjustified and unjustifiable heterogeneity of theoretical forms that are freely conjectured 
by the human mind, a systematic, critically-eliminative, winnowing and weeding-out from among the 
variations, and the retention of selected variations. And just as in Darwin’s natural selection hypothesis, 
the question as to whether a retained theory is in some sense justified is as irrelevant as any question 
about whether any biological mutation is justified—mere survival does not guarantee the future of the 
survivor (Bartley III 1987). In Popper’s (2005 [1983] p. 64) terms:   
…like Darwin, I did not assume that something (whether an animal or a theory) that has shown its fitness to survive 
tests by surviving them has shown its fitness to survive all, or most, or any future tests. In fact, I believe that a theory, 
however well tested, may be refuted tomorrow—especially if somebody tries hard to refute it, and especially if he has 
a new idea about testing it.  
Indeed Popper (1974) was impressed by Campbell’s (1974a) interpretation of his philosophy as an 
‘evolutionary epistemology’ because it anticipated the content of some of his (at that time) unpublished 
papers. These came to be collected in the book Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (Popper 
1979 [1972]). Moreover, Popper (1979 [1972]; 1994a) summarized the evolutionary epistemology that 
Campbell had distilled into his ‘variation-selection-retention’ schema with his own formulation. It may 
be elaborated in many ways and I introduce one form of it here because I shall make further use of it in 
the final section of this paper: 
P1→TT→EE→P2 
Where: ‘P1’ is a theoretical or practical problem; ‘TT’ are the conjectural trial theories, tools or 
technologies which are creatively offered in order to solve that problem; ‘EE’ is a process of error 
elimination by way of systematic tests, comparative appraisal and rational criticism; and ‘P2’ is the new 
problem that evolves from the critical activity. 
Although an outline of this schema was first offered in Popper (1940), he came to use it to summarize his 
ideas about the evolution of knowledge in all kinds of different contexts: empirical science, technology, 
philosophy, history and ideology ((1979 [1972]; 1994a; 1994b). This so-called ‘evolutionary 
epistemology’ or ‘philosophical Darwinism’ came to be widely discussed in the literature on 
epistemology (Campbell 1974a; Radnitzky and Bartley 1987; Popper 1999; Munz 1985, 1993, 2004; 
Rowbottom 2011). 
Where Generalized Darwinism Does, and Does Not, Work 
If the two pillars to GD’s account of ‘organizational evolution’ are understood as schemata, then where 
the account works, and where it does not, becomes clear. 
GD claims that organizations are subject to a population-level selection process. And GD uses the 
interactor-replicator distinction to schematically summarise its supposedly Darwinian nature: 
organizations-cum-interactors are selected causing a differential replication in the routines-cum-
replicators that the organizations host. But as Reydon and Scholz (2014) note, the underlying process that 
is supposedly distilled by that schema cannot resemble its biological equivalent. Organizations, in the GD 
account, may be called interactors, and their copy-ready routines may be called replicators, but these 
interactors do not populate stable and buffered reproductive communities with ancestor-descendent and 
mating relations between members. They cannot therefore breed organization-cum-interactor offspring, 
and this means that there cannot be differential reproduction of heritable routines-cum-replicators over 
time—with latter generations of organization-cum-interactors inheriting the traits of their forerunners. 
Reydon and Scholz (2014) are surely correct to emphasise these differences as compared to neo-
Darwinian biology. In that respect GD’s usage of the interactor-replicator schema refers to an underlying 
process that is dissimilar to what is found in neo-Darwinian biology. Indeed, by those lights, GD’s claim 
that ‘organizational evolution’ is to be understood as a Darwinian process does not work. 
But if, as GD claims, the interactor-replicator distinction does in fact apply to non-biological social 
organizations at a high level of abstraction, then what mechanisms is it schematically summarising? As 
previously noted, on the one hand it is used to cover the idea that routines-cum-replicators may be 
                                                     
8 Campbell (1974a p. 415 [emphasis added]) wrote: ‘The advances produced in the course of evolution are now seen as due to 
natural-selection…Considered as improvements or solutions, none of these variations has any a priori validity. None has the status 
of revealed truth…whatever degree of validation emerges comes from the differential survival of the winnowing, weeding out 
process…Popper’s first contribution to an evolutionary epistemology is to recognize the process of the succession of theories in 
science as a similar selective elimination process’. 
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diffused—by imitation—from one existing organization-cum-interactor to another. And on the other 
hand, it is used to cover the idea that routines-cum-replicators may be inherited by a new interactor-cum-
organization from an extant interactor-cum-organization—by means of a business spin-off or franchise 
arrangement. A market-based selection process of organizations supposedly then makes for the 
differential diffusion and inheritance of routines. By those lights, or so GD claims, there is a form of 
‘Darwinian’ evolution.  
But for my own part, I fail to see the significance of GD’s distinction between ‘diffusion’ and 
‘inheritance’—aside from the fact that the latter invites the invocation of biological metaphors such as 
‘parent’, ‘offspring’, and ‘inheritance’. Granted that both of the so-called ‘diffusion’ and ‘inheritance’ 
scenarios would seem to require the replication of information, but that is really just a short-hand 
description of what is actually happening. What both require is a person understanding a routine as a 
solution to a business or organizational problem, either on the basis of their own subjective memory of its 
prior application, or with the assistance of it being recorded as an objective knowledge product that is 
external to their mind; for instance in a handbook, textbook, manual, or plan. Thus, just as routines 
influence the affairs of the organization and the material world through us, they are also transferred from 
organization to organization by us. Subjective thought processes and acts of thinking are the intermediary 
through which abstract business plans or franchise models are put into effect. It is a person who carries 
routines from one situation to another, attempting to trial and/or imitate their application in a new context. 
Speaking of an organization as an ‘offspring’, that ‘inherits’ information from a ‘parent’ simply obscures 
this with a biological metaphor. In short, what is the use of the interactor-replicator schema if its 
proponents seem unable to grasp the details of this process without making recourse to the very biological 
metaphors and analogies that the schema is intended to transcend? 
Indeed, I think that what we are talking about here is the interaction between what Popper (1979 [1972]; 
1994a) called ‘World 1, 2 and 3’. World 1 being comprised of physical material objects, world 2 of 
mental states, and world 3 by the objective products of the human mind—such as the aforementioned 
contents of handbooks, textbooks, manuals, or plans. World 3 objects, according to Popper (1979 [1972], 
possess a reality that is autonomous from the material media on which they may be recorded. The GD 
account, I argue, implicitly recognizes the interaction of worlds 1, 2 and 3. We are told that routines are 
‘…organizational dispositions to energize conditional patterns of behaviour within teams’ (Hodgson 
2013a p. 977). And we are told that ‘…firms can alter their routines (replicators), whereas (outside 
modern genetic engineering) no biological organism can manipulate its genes (replicators)’ (Hodgson 
2013a p. 984). But this presupposes, I argue, a complex ontology that is hardly captured by the vague 
notion that organizations possess an ‘ontological communality’ (Hodgson 2013a p. 978). What it seems to 
require, once the ontological dots are connected together so to speak, is that: firstly, a routine is 
something that is able to inform an individual’s subjective dispositions (i.e. world 3 interacts with world 
2); secondly, those subjective dispositions have a consequent energized effect on the material world 
(world 2 interacts with world 1); thirdly, the routines are something that are amenable to alteration by 
becoming the focus of criticism (world 2 interacts with world 3). A routine must therefore be an 
autonomous, objective knowledge product that is open to criticism via interaction with the human mind. 
Only then can a routine be open to further adaptation in its own right. And of course, the GD account 
makes room for this because it claims that it allows for so-called organizational-level adaptation—the 
deliberate adaptation of routines to environmental factors within any particular organization. But in itself 
this shows the inadequacy of the interactor-replicator schematic picture: that it is organizations as 
interactors that interact. In actuality, the supposed routine-cum-replicators may be interacting with the 
critical acumen of an organization’s people all of the time. 
But if the interactor-replicator generalized term is a poor schema with which to represent what is going 
on, one that fails to capture any striking commonality between Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural 
selection and the mechanisms that drive the supposed evolution of organizations, then GD’s account of 
evolutionary change collapses to its first schema: variation-selection-retention. And indeed, I argue that 
the notion of routines being ‘diffused’, ‘inherited’ and ‘altered’ is easily accommodated by this. This is 
especially obvious when the conceptual triplet of variation-selection-retention is elaborated, not by the 
interactor-replicator distinction, but by Popper’s (1979 [1972], 1994a) schema of P1→TT→EE→P2.. 
Take, for instance, the case of the deliberate adaptation of organizational routines to environmental 
factors—what GD claimed to be organization-level adaptation through the intentional decision making of 
organizational leaders. How might Popper’s schema summarize this? The leaders receive reports of a 
problem situation, P1. They creatively formulate trial theories TT—conjectured without any a priori 
justification—of how to alter routines to resolve the problem situation. Error elimination, EE, follows—
by way of the critical testing of the new routines in the organization and an assessment of whether they 
improve the problem situation. Any aspect of the testable TT that has seemingly withstood the testing and 
criticism may be selected and retained. A new problem situation, P2, arises. If P2 is very different to P1 the 
organization may have changed a lot; if not it may have changed very little—perhaps having only 
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eliminated the prospects for TT. Making no changes, by doing nothing other than what has previously 
been done, may also be considered to be a trial theory—albeit perhaps a dogmatically held hope that P1 
will improve of its own accord. On the other hand, a P2 that significantly differs from P1 may present an 
enormous environmental problem of a very different magnitude to a competitor of the organization in 
focus. The very existence of P2 may demonstrate that its products and mode of organization are now 
defunct, or will, at best, come to occupy only a niche. Consider, for instance, the predicament of the 
horse-drawn buggy manufacturers at the advent of the Ford motor car. Indeed, this may also illustrate 
why often we replace the label ‘evolutionary’ market change with the label ‘revolutionary’ market 
change. 
Or take the replication of extant routines by so-called ‘diffusion’ or ‘inheritance’—which I have argued 
above do not really differ. Here, the problem is simply one of imitating and copying the performance of a 
routine as exactly as possible—either from the subjective memory of its prior performance, or from its 
objective recording in a plan, handbook, or manual. This will in itself be a special case of 
P1→TT→EE→P2, where it is discernible copy-error that requires elimination (EE). Of course, given the 
case outlined above, even a perfect copy may be useless if the routine is unsuitable to the new 
environmental circumstance to which it is applied. 
Or take GD’s idea that what the so-called ‘diffusion’ and ‘inheritance’ of routines helps to develop, at an 
elementary level, are habits in the living, breathing, organisms that populate a social organization: 
Habits are the most elementary replicators in social evolution. They are learned dispositions to behave in a particular 
way in a particular circumstance (Hodgson 2013a p. 977). 
Here, following Popper (2002c [1974] p. 52), we may say that, given a theory T that a particular practical 
action should be done in a problem circumstance P, there is the repeated practical performance of the 
action. Change then follows, through a process of error elimination EE until the performance of certain 
actions or reactions become almost automatic within an individual. Think of a soldier who is able to strip 
and reassemble a rifle even when blindfolded. 
As these illustrations may indicate, the use of Popper’s P1→TT→EE→P2 schema highlights something 
other than GD’s emphasis on the adaptation or replication of ‘problem-solving or developmental 
information’ (Hodgson 2013a p. 977). For that underplays the growth of objective knowledge as it moves 
from old problems to new problems: P1→P2. GD’s image of population-level change through the 
winnowing out of interactors with disadvantageous routines hardly captures this aspect to social change. 
Popper (1994a p. 11) offered the example of Henry Ford:  
Henry Ford’s original problem was: how can we provide transport for the vast spaces of the United States? This was 
his P1. He proposed the theory: by building a cheap motor car. This led through various trials and errors to a new 
problem: how can we provide the roads and parking spaces needed for our cars? The original problem P1 was the 
problem of transport. The new problem is the traffic problem—a problem of frustration. 
Hence the diagrammatic schema might resemble figure 1, where the development of objective knowledge 
concerning the original problem, P1, proliferates new problems P2, P3,…Pn. In the case of the motor car 
these might be: road traffic congestion, pollution, urban planning, the supply of fuel, travel safety etc. 
Others speak of the ‘revenge effect of technology’ (Tenner 1996). 
Thus, physical tools, social technologies, managerial methods, information technologies… all may have 
repercussions and unintended consequences. In The Open Society and Its Enemies, (1966 [1945] p. 162) 
Popper wrote: 
…we are making…experiments all the time. The introduction of a new-kind of life insurance, of a new kind of 
taxation, of a new penal reform, are all social experiments which have their repercussions throughout the whole of 
society…Even a man who opens a new shop…is carrying out a kind of social experiment on a small scale; and all our 
knowledge of social conditions is based on experience gained by making experiments of this kind. 




Figure 1: Popper’s evolutionary schema applied to a practical technology. 
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Finally, is it legitimate to use the labels ‘evolutionary’ or ‘Darwinian’ to describe these distinctly 
‘Popperian’ schematic representations? As was earlier noted, it was the American psychologist, Donald 
Campbell, who first used the label ‘evolutionary’ (1974a p. 413) to characterize Popper’s epistemology. 
He did so because he thought that Popper’s philosophy of science incorporated the three conceptual core 
elements that he associated with the Darwinian evolutionary sequence: ‘variation-selection-retention’ 
(Campbell 1974a p. 421, 1974b p. 143). Campbell (1974a p. 434) also recognized, although perhaps in a 
more circumspect way, the same sequence in Popper’s ideas about the growth of World 3 objective 
knowledge more generally. Popper (1994a p. 63) also described his own schema of P1→TT→EE→P2 as a 
‘… theory of emergent evolution through problem-solving’ and even as ‘… a generalization of Darwin’. 
But Popper explicitly presented this theory as a schema. Unlike a scientific theory, neither Campbell’s 
conceptual triplet nor Popper’s schema possess first-order explanatory power. Thus, as Popper (1994b p. 
63) says, they represent a ‘generalization of Darwin’. This seems to me to be a better characterization of 
their schematic basis than the more scientifically sounding ‘Generalized Darwinism’. 
Conclusion 
Generalized Darwinism (GD) claims to be a conceptual and theoretical framework for researching 
evolutionary change processes in organizations. But how this framework ought to be interpreted requires 
careful consideration. In contrast to Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection proper, the GD 
framework is not an explanatory deductive argument form. What it is that GD actually generalizes and 
intends to explain thereby becomes somewhat moot. My own conclusion is that GD is best summarized 
by two general schemata that purport to distil supposed commonalities between processes of 
‘organizational evolution’ and biological evolution. That terminology may dispel any confusion about 
GD’s epistemological and methodological status. But in considering the applicability of the two schemata 
to the social domain, criticism reveals one to be problematic, whereas the other, to which the GD 
programme collapses if the problematical schema is dispensed with, has long been associated with 
another so-called ‘evolutionary approach’ to the understanding of social change: Sir Karl Popper’s 
‘evolutionary epistemology’. Thus, contrary to the impression that is given by the proponents of GD, 
organizational theorists need not commit to the GD framework before appropriating the term ‘evolution’. 
Indeed, if organizational theorists are interested in formulating an account of the evolutionary character of 
social and organizational change, then they may do so by using the objective knowledge epistemology of 
Sir Karl Popper. His is an epistemology that has been widely described as both ‘evolutionary’ and 
‘Darwinian’. 
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